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FAMILY LAW REFORM IN THE 1980's*
Mary Ann Glendon**

We are all familiar with the folksy wisdom expressed in the saying,
"If it isn't broken, don't fix it." The experience of the past twenty years,
when far-reaching changes were made in the family law of nearly every
American state at the same time that American family behavior was
undergoing rapid and profound changes, suggests a corollary or two to
this saying: "Don't fix it until you know what's wrong with it," or,
"Don't fix it while it is right in the middle of falling apart." It is beginning to seem that the 1960's and 1970's-when divorce rates and women's
and mothers' labor force participation rates were increasing at unprecedented speed, when the female-headed, single-parent family became
the fastest-growing family type in the United States, and when informal
cohabitation approached Scandinavian proportions-were not ideal times
for sober and reflective law reform efforts. Whether or not the time was
right, however, there was more activity in American family law in that
twenty-year period than there had been in the preceding hundred years.
In view of the more or less continuous upheaval in patterns of family
behavior during the past twenty years, a reasonable reaction to the foregoing observations would be to ask whether we have any grounds to suppose there will ever be a time when family law reform can proceed under
better conditions. According to recent data from the United States Census Bureau, the answer seems to be yes, and that time is the present.
The reason is that many of the trends of the 1960's and 1970's appear
to have peaked and levelled off.
In a statement made in 1979 before the United States House of
Representatives Select Committee on Population, Census Bureau
Demographer Paul Glick stated that the United States seems to be entering a period of relative stability in family behavior.' He pointed out that
changes in family life are strongly related to changes in the birth rate,
to the school and college enrollment rates, and to women's labor force
participation rates. The birth rate, he noted, has declined about as far
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as it can go, with the average family expecting to have no more than
two children.2 The great increase in high school and college enrollment
in the 1960's and 1970's has also levelled off.3 As for women's labor
force participation (which jumped from thirty-eight percent in 1960 to
fifty-two percent in 1980, and increased even more dramatically for
mothers of pre-school and school-age children), 4 Glick said that "the odds
seem to favor a slackening of the rate of increase . . . over the next
decade or two." 5 The divorce rate, that potent generator of legal issues,
more than doubled between 1963 and 1975, but has fluctuated little and
even declined slightly in the past few years. 6 Glick concluded his 1979
report by predicting that "most of the changes in family life over the
next two decades will be small as compared with those during the last
two decades."'
If Glick's prediction is correct, we are presently in a better position
than we have been in for many years to take stock of our situation and
to try to determine what kinds of legal measures will be appropriate for
the current needs and desires of American families. It follows, too, that
states like Louisiana that did not jump hastily on the family law reform
bandwagon now have the opportunity to attack the most pressing problems in the area in a more calm and rational way than some of their
sister states. Indeed, the writer will go further, in the case of Louisiana,
to suggest that, now that the dust is beginning to settle, certain institutions of the civil law which at various times during the past twenty years
may have seemed outmoded to some observers, now reveal great promise
for approaching some of the most challenging contemporary family law
problems.
But let us not minimize the difficulties. Even though the demographic
data indicate that changes in American family behavior in the near future
will not be so rapid or profound as they were in the 1960's and 1970's,
the data also plainly tell us that there is no going back to the way things
were. The cyclone may have passed, but the landscape has changed irrevocably. Thus, before turning to specific issues of family law reform
for the 1980's, it might be well for us to remind ourselves of some of
the principal features of our current and foreseeable situation. Again, the
writer is relying, not on the wild speculations of futurologists, but on
prosaic documents issued by the United States Government Printing Office.
Nearly half of all marriages now being formed are expected to end in

2. Id., at 1.
3. Id.
4. S. Bianchi & D. Spain, American Women: Three Decades of Change 1, 15-18 (Bureau
of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce Aug. 1983).
5. Glick, supra note 1, at 1.
6. S. Bianchi & D. Spain, supra note 4, at 3; Glick, supra note 1, at 2-3.
7. Id. at 5.
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divorce,' and about sixty percent of all divorces now involve couples with
young children, 9 a figure that can be expected to decline slightly as the
population ages. After divorce, about ninety percent of these children remain in their mother's custody, a figure that has not changed much since
1960'" despite twenty years of sex-neutral laws, a great deal of
"consciousness-raising," and the impression created by films like Kramer
v. Kramer. It is estimated that nearly half-four of ten-of all American
children will spend a significant part of their childhood in a single-parent
family before reaching age eighteen." In 1982, twenty-two percent of all
children under eighteen were in such families.' 2 The financial circumstances
of female-headed households are precarious. The mothers' standards of
living typically fall precipitously after divorce, even though their labor
force participation rates go up.' 3 Many fall below the poverty level. Indeed, the poverty population has become largely a population of women
and children.'"
The unprecedented nature of many of the phenomena facing the family
law reformer today means that we cannot simply plug in legal devices
which worked well in an earlier time and under different conditions. Law
reform in the 1980's will require us to muster all our collective imagination, intelligence, expertise, good will, and concern for our fellow men,
women, and-especially-children. On the occasion of this Family Law
Colloquium, the writer would like to discuss three specific areas where
law reform has become necessary because of changed social and
demographic conditions, and where the common-law states have, in the
writer's view, something to learn from the approach of the civil law. These
are the areas of reallocation of family property upon divorce, private ordering of marital property relations through contract, and protection of family
members against disinheritance.
REALLOCATION OF FAMILY PROPERTY UPON DIVORCE

Of these three areas the one in which recent legal change has been
8. S. Bianchi & D. Spain, supra note 4, at 3.
9. Divorce, Child Custody, and Child Support, in Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Current Population Reports: Special Studies 8 (series P-23, no. 84 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Divorce].
10. Glick, supra note 1, at 2-3.
II. Divorce, supra note 9, at 3.
12. Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1982, in Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports 5 (series P-20, no. 380 1983).
13. Grossman, Divorced and Separated Wumen in the Labor Force-An Update, 101
Monthly Lab. Rev. 43, 43 (Oct. 1978); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L.
Rev. 1181, 1265-66 (1981). See generally C. Adams & D. Cooper, A Guide for Judges in
Child Support Enforcement 1-9 (1982); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, A Growing Crisis:
Disadvantaged Women and Their Children (1983).
14.

Divorce, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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most dramatic is that of property division upon divorce. In barely ten
years, following the example of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(U.M.D.A.) as amended in 1973," nearly all American separate and community property states have abandoned their systems of fixed rules for
determining how property should be allocated after divorce and have gone
over to variants of systems which give the courts substantial discretion
to disregard legal title (or the distinction between community and separate
property) and to redistribute the spouses' property in the manner that
the judge considers fair.' 6 Usually, but not always, the judge is provided
with a set of statutory guidelines for the exercise of such discretion. These
schemes, which were presented to state legislatures under the name
"equitable distribution," are more properly called discretionary distribution, since what consistently distinguishes them from their predecessors
is not that they are more equitable, but that they are more unpredictable.
These statutes, adopted in haste, are now giving the states that adopted
them the opportunity to repent at leisure.
In the first place, the system of discretionary distribution, because
of inconsistency in results among apparently similar cases, is widely perceived as unfair by litigants. Second, this unpredictability of outcome
means the law in this area is not serving one of its most important purposes:
to furnish a basis for negotiation and future planning by the parties. This
is especially important in view of the fact that over ninety percent of
divorce cases are settled by agreement. Third, these laws and their guidelines offer the opportunity for, and even encourage, abuse of the litigation and negotiation processes more than do systems of fixed rules.
Fourth, it is seriously open to question whether consensus supports, or
any rational policy is served by, a view of marriage in itself as engaging
all one's property no matter when or how acquired, when it is estimated
that nearly one marriage in two will end in divorce, many of them within
the first few years. Fifth, discretionary distribution has been accompanied
by developments in the law governing marriage contracts that make it
extremely difficult for lawyers to assure persons who have legitimate desires
to contract out of the system that they can avoid its operation. In sum,
the existing law in most states throws divorcing spouses-and their
children-into a lottery whose outcome greatly depends on the luck of
the judicial draw and the competence of counsel, and in which the only
sure winners are the lawyers.
The remedy for all these defects of discretionary distribution, however,
is not simply to go back to the predecessor systems of separate property

15. Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 307, alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 142-43 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as U.M.D.A.].
16. For a discussion of this process and a description of the statutes, see generally
M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 57-68 (1981).
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and community of acquests. One reason for the widespread adoption of
discretionary distribution was that those older systems were not functioning well in the new world of no-fault divorce, which removed the leverage
an economically weaker spouse usually had in bargaining with a partner
who wished to terminate the marriage. The separate property systems were
perceived as unfair, especially to women who had stayed home to raise
children and who had no income or property of their own. Traditional
community property systems had the defect that a flat, equal division of
acquests often requires the sale and division of the proceeds of the family's
only substantial asset, the marital home, with resulting hardship to the
children and the custodial spouse.17
In the writer's view, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there
is no satisfactory way of handling the economic aspects of modern divorce
within the conventional framework of matrimonial property and family
support law. Is there some other way to cut through these problems? The
writer believes there is. It makes sense to begin, not with some vague
notion of partnership, but by looking at the features which the statistically most frequently-occurring types of divorce have in common. At once,
three facts stand out: (1) Most divorces (about sixty percent) involve minor
children; 8 (2) most divorces involve marriages of relatively short duration;' 9
and (3) the property of most divorcing couples, especially in these two
categories, includes few assets besides the marital home and household
goods, the earning power of the spouses, and, in the case of middle-aged
persons, their pension rights.2 0 Further, it seems probable (1) that there
is a fairly substantial consensus in our society on several aspects of how
these facts (and their various permutations and combinations) should be
treated in divorce; (2) that this consensus is already being reflected, albeit
somewhat haphazardly, in the behavior of the courts; and (3) that if these
suppositions are correct, certain changes in the law are both feasible and
indicated in the 1980's.
Almost everyone in Western countries would agree that, in principle,
the basic rules of matrimonial property law, like those of intestate succession law, should be framed with the needs and desires of the majority
of people who will potentially be affected by them in mind. From this
point of view, however, the main problem with existing marital property
and support law in most American states is that it contemplates, not the
typical case or cases, but a special case. That special case, as exemplified
by the U.M.D.A., is that in which sufficient property exists to permit
17.

For a recent critical examination of the equal-division principle, see Fineman,

Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 789,

826-42.
18.
19.
20.

Divorce, supra note 9.
Glick, supra note 1, at 2.
M. Glendon, supra note 16, at 91-96.
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a clean break between the spouses."' The principal defect shared by most
existing laws and the major law reform proposals such as the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act is that their basic premises are inapplicable
to nearly three-fifths of all divorces-those that involve minor children.
For example, U.M.D.A.'s principle that there should be no maintenance
to a former spouse unless special needs exist22 must be applied by courts
in a world where the majority of cases involve a custodial spouse who,
for that reason alone, does have special needs. To be sure, the fact that
a spouse may be caring for young children is mentioned in the U.M.D.A.
guidelines on need, 2 but why make the prevailing situation the exception
rather than the starting point? The rehabilitation principle, which would
limit maintenance to the short period necessary to make the formerly
dependent spouse self-supporting, is even less suited to the situation of
the custodian of young children who typically will not be able to combine child care with highly remunerative market work. In sum, the idea
of effecting a clean break by dividing property between the spouses and
excluding maintenance after divorce does not come to grips with the fact
that no legal system has been able to achieve this result on a widespread
basis because, in most divorce cases, children are present and there is
insufficient property. All these reform models are examples of Thomas
Reed Powell's famous definition of the legal mind as the mind that can
think of something that is inextricably connected to something else without
thinking of what it is connected to.
In 1980, the English Law Commission said with respect to divorce
suits that involve minor children:
In such cases it may well be thought the primary concern must
be for a broken family rather than a broken marriage; and the
welfare of the children, social, psychological and economic, should
take precedence over the adjustment of financial rights and duties
4
of former spouses toward each other.

21. The prefatory note to the U.M.D.A. states: "[Biecause of its property division
provisions, the Act does not continue the traditional reliance upon maintenance as the primary
means of support for divorced spouses." U.M.D.A., commissioners' prefatory note, 9A
U.L.A. 93 (1973). The comment to U.M.D.A. § 308 on maintenance states:
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 (property division) is to encourage the court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by property
disposition rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the available property is insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable
to secure employment appropriate to his skills and interests or is occupied with
child care may an award of maintenance be ordered.
Id. at 160-61.
22. Id. § 308 & comment, at 160-61.
23. Id. § 308(a)(2), at 160.
24. The Law Commission, The Financial Consequences of Divorce: The Basic Policy
103, English L. Comm'n Rep. 3-4 (1980).
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Here we have a new and appropriate starting point for thinking about
property division on divorce, which we may call the "children-first principle." This principle rests on a notion that most people in our society
probably would accept: the fact of having children impresses a lien upon
all of the parents' income and property to the extent necessary to provide
for the children's decent subsistence at least until those children reach
the age of majority. Unlike the conflicting and competing principles on
the rights of the spouses in current marital property law, this principle
has the twin virtues that it is relatively non-controversial and that it applies to the majority of cases.
What would happen if this children-first principle were explicitly given
the highest rank in marital property law? In the first place, until the welfare
of the child or children was adequately secured, there would be no such
thing as "marital" property, but only "family" property. This would
reflect the economic and sociological reality of the circumstances of most
people with children. In fact, it would not alter the outcomes of cases
so much as it would sanction and encourage what most judges are already
trying to do within the framework of the discretionary distribution system
and its variants. John Eekelaar of Oxford University recently examined
the reported decisions under the English version of discretionary distribution and discovered that one major principle above all emerges from the
English case law on post-divorce financial support, though it is nowhere
to be found in the English statutes. This principle is that "[a]dequate
provision must be made to ensure the support and accommodation of
the children of the marriage." 25
A parallel case-law development appears to be occurring within the
United States.26 It is safe to say that in the majority of cases involving
dependent children, the best possible outcome usually will be no more
than the piecing together, from property and income and in-kind personal care, of support for the basic needs of the children. One way or
another, the household goods and matrimonial home, or its use for a
period of time, usually will and should be awarded to the custodial spouse.
The fact that the dwelling and household goods are apt to be the only
significant property of a young couple with growing children means that
marital property law (as distinct from support law) will often have nothing
more to do once the question of the use of the dwelling (and accounting
or compensation, if any, for such use) is settled. This explains why Max
Rheinstein and the writer's comparative marital property survey in the
1970's showed a marked trend toward the development of a special legal
regime for such property within marital property systems all over the

25. Eekelaar, Some Principles of Financial and Property Adjustment on Divorce, 95
Law Q. Rev. 253, 256 (1979).
26. See Annot., 19 A.L.R. 4th 239 (1983).
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Western world.27 If there is other property, however, the children-first
principle would require that title and time of acquisition be disregarded
until the welfare of the children and their custodian is adequately secured.
(Implicit in all this are assumptions that child support, custody, spousal
support and property division cannot be neatly separated from each other
in practice and that, in child support, the needs of minor children include
a component of custodial care.)
At this point one might well ask why the children-first principle needs
to be explicitly introduced into existing law if it substantially reflects what
judges are already doing. At the simplest level, the answer is that predictability and even-handedness would be served by making explicit what
is implicit, and by making mandatory what is now optional. Beyond this,
it is to be expected that giving express legal primacy to the welfare of
children would improve consumer satisfaction with the system by basing
it on a principle that both spouses and the public in general can understand and accept. It is much easier to find support for the idea that childbegetting involves lasting economic responsibility and engages all one's
economic resources to the extent necessary, than that marriage does so.
It may even be hoped that the principle will have a salutary effect on
the attitudes of the spouses themselves-bringing out their better natures,
as it were. In one recent English study, divorce litigants repeatedly
expressed astonishment at how little attention was paid to their children
in the divorce process. 28 The litigants thought the legal system had it
backwards by concentrating on the dead marriage rather than on the living
children, and they were right-not only about England but the United
States as well.
Another benefit to be expected from the children-first principle is that
it will bring out into the open the fact that childless and child-rearing
marriages involve different social, political and moral issues and should
therefore be analyzed separately. Just as corporate law has had to
distinguish between publicly-held and close corporations, and commercial
law between law for merchants' dealings among themselves and law for
their dealings with consumers, so family law should now distinguish law
for the married couple from law for the family with children. Finally
(and this point suggests a corollary to the principle), if it is accepted that
there is a high social interest in providing the best possible conditions
for child-raising, there should be some form of recognition in family property division for the efforts of persons who have devoted a substantial
part of their lives to child-raising, even if they are not currently custo27. Rheinstein & Glendon, Interspousal Relations, in 4 Int'l Encyclopedia Comp. L.
177 (A. Chloros ed. 1980); see also Comment, The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable
Distribution?, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089, 1114 (1983).
28. Elston, Fuller & Murch, Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce Petitions, 38
Mod. L. Rev. 609, 618-19, 632-33, 637, 640 (1975).

19841

FAMILY LA W

1561

dians of minor children. Arguably, this should be so, at least if such a
person has thereby incurred disadvantages in the job market or with respect
to retirement income.
It is further suggested that it is probably more useful to look at this
as a question of population, rather than of marriage, policy. The issue
is whether the obligations incurred by begetting children should include
responsibilities toward a spouse who has suffered detriment by performing the important social function of child-raising, and, more broadly,
whether we should try to promote the welfare of future citizens by making
child-raising a less risky career than it is at present. If the children-first
principle can be extended to buttress a spouse's current position caused
by past as well as present child care, then we can count among the cases
that would be covered by the principle not only the sixty percent of
divorces that involve minor children, but the undetermined, yet undoubtedly large, group of divorces involving spouses who have incurred
economic disadvantages through raising children in the past. This gives
us an impressive number of cases in which title to, and time of acquisition of, property might be disregarded in order to further important and
widely recognized social goals. This is not to say that it will be a simple
matter to determine what the form and modalities of compensation for
past child-raising activities should be, or how the needs of children in
a broken family are to be meshed with needs of children in a new family
formed by the former provider. Judicial discretion would still be called
for in all of these cases, but judges would be left in no doubt about
the primary goal.
The children-first principle not only marks out the right direction (if
not the precise path) in the cases it covers, but it also serves to bring
the issues in the remaining, more controversial, cases into sharper focus.
The cases that would not be included within the children-first principle
are the following: divorces terminating childless marriages; divorces where
there is property left over after the principle and its corollary have been
satisfied; and cases where neither parent has incurred economic detriment
as a result of child-raising. Within the framework just suggested, these
would be the true "marital property," as distinct from "family property," cases. These are far from being the most frequently occurring situations, but they are ones which have excited lively controversy.
With respect to these true marital property cases, it is also possible
to identify a property division principle which is more likely to attract
consensus under modern conditions than any competing position. The principle is one which Max Rheinstein, Kevin Gray and the writer have each
advocated,2 9 and it will sound familiar to Louisianians: property which

29. M. Glendon, State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the United States
and Western Europe 267 (1977); K. Gray, Reallocation of Property on Divorce 127-51,
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is acquired by gainful activity during the marriage should be divided
equally, in the absence of agreement to the contrary. This old principle
of the Spanish community of gains has several virtues in the modern context: (1) it avoids the expense, unpredictability and vagaries of discretionary
division; (2) it is a neat solution to the problem of how to distinguish
short- and long-term childless marriages because it automatically proportions property-sharing to the duration of the marriage and excludes division of premarital property, gifts and inheritances identifiable as such;
(3) it discourages, to a great extent, that useless rehashing of the history
of the marriage which is invited by statutory guidelines on discretionary
property division; (4) it has the merit of serving as a framework for private
ordering of the financial aspects of divorce by enabling the spouses to
know what the likely result will be if their affairs are settled by a judge.
Some Americans might react to this notion the way Mark Twain once
did when he heard about a new idea that displeased him: "It's unAmerican! It's immoral! Why, it's downright French!" But Louisianians
have held fast to the community of acquests (which they received, not
from France, but from Spain) and, if the writer is not mistaken, they
have been served well by it.
If a random sample of American men and women were asked what
system they favored for settling property disputes on divorce in the absence
of children, it is doubtful that any significant number would want to give
a lower court judge carte blanche to rearrange their affairs in the way
that seems best to him or her. Yet this is just what now happens in most
American states. It seems more likely that the average couple would choose
a simple equal division of what they had acquired through their respective efforts during the marriage over the discretion system with its uncertainty and its controversy-provoking guidelines. In situations where exact
justice is unattainable, most people understand and accept pragmatic rules
like the equal division of acquests.
Let us now briefly consider the kinds of cases that would be left over
after application of the "children-first" principle in the cases where it
applies, and after equal division of acquests where that is called for. These
cases would include situations where one spouse is left with some, or
perhaps even a great deal of, individual property, or where there is great
disparity between the spouses' income or earning power. There would also
be cases where one spouse is not only in a weaker economic position than
the other, but also is disabled or otherwise in need, unrelated to childraising. Here it seems that the beginning of wisdom is to identify these
problems for what they are. What is at stake is mainly the allocation
235-36, 266 (1977); Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 Willamette L.J. 413, 434-35
(1976); see also Stone, The Law Commission: Third Report on Family Property: The
Matrimonial Home (Co-Ownership and Occupation Rights) and Household Goods. (Law
Com. No. 86), 42 Mod. L. Rev. 192, 198 (1979).
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of costs between the public and private sectors. No principle seems as
compelling in these cases as the "children-first" principle does in the cases
to which it applies. Thus, different legislatures may well come to different conclusions about whether the ex-spouse or the taxpayer should
pay in such cases.
The framework that has been presented here is in the nature of an
architectural sketch without detailed specifications. The writer does not
pretend that the instrumentation of this design would be simple. Nor would
its implementation completely solve another major family law problem
of the 1980's: continuing financial provision for children after divorce
(child support). It is to be hoped that family law reform in the 1980's
will address the problem of child support by being more realistic about
what it costs to raise children and by utilizing better methods of collection and enforcement-such as direct deduction from the provider's
paycheck. Here we have much to learn from Sweden. This supposedly
socialist welfare state, while assuring decent subsistence from public funds
to all families with children, has never wavered in putting primary responsibility for child support where it belongs-on the parents.30 Sweden's support enforcement procedures are among the most efficient in the world.
At this juncture, one may wonder whether a possible drawback in
making the welfare of minor children the central issue in cases where they
are present will encourage more of that particularly destructive form of
litigation in which one spouse puts, or threatens to put, the other's fitness
for custody in issue in order to prevail in financial matters. The California experience, as reported by Weitzman and Dixon, is encouraging on
this point. In that state, no-fault divorce did not, as many had feared,
lead to an increase in custody litigation for leverage in financial matters. 3'
Ideally, of course, both the "children-first" principle and the equal division of acquests rule should be implemented in connection with, and in
turn should aid the functioning of, non-adversarial divorce procedures.
It is encouraging that the idea of giving priority to the interests of
children in cases where they are involved seems to be acquiring a certain
momentum, which may someday lead to a complete reconceptualization
of the field of marital property law and its reorganization into an area
that might better be called family property law.32 In England, a new

30. A. Agell, Paying of Maintenance in Sweden, 4-7, 10-19, 22-23 (1983).
31. Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. Rev. 471,
490 (1979).
32. The English family law scholar, John Eekelaar of Pembroke College, Oxford, has
urged that a "fundamental distinction should be made . . . between marriages in which
children have been reared and childless marriages," and has also endorsed the notion that
equal division of acquests may be the most appropriate principle for winding up the property aspects of childless marriages. J. Eekelaar, Family Law and Social Policy, 121 (2d
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matrimonial and family proceedings bill which is currently making its way
through Parliament retains the system of discretionary distribution, but
would amend the guidelines to require judges to give priority to the welfare
of children.3 3 If adopted, depending on how English judges interpret and
apply it, this new provision could transform English property division and
support law. As public awareness spreads of the extent of the child support problem in the United States and of the precipitous drop in living
standards experienced by custodial parents and children after divorce, the
need to systematically reformulate the law governing divorces involving
children will become increasingly apparent. This will perhaps provoke a
long needed reappraisal of the rights and responsibilities of parents in
principle. An appropriate place to start this process might be with a fundamental, but half-forgotten, text of modern liberal thought.
John Stuart Mill, in his famous essay On Liberty, endeavored to set
forth a general principle by which the legitimacy of governmental interference with individual liberty could be tested. That principle was that
"the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others." 3 Less well-remembered is Mill's reasoning about why a general
theory about liberty is necessary and why the traditional English suspicion of governmental power is insufficient to protect the individual. Mill
argued that, without some such recognized general principle, liberty not
only is often withheld where it should be granted, but is just as often
granted where it should be withheld.3 His prime example of a misplaced
grant of liberty was drawn from family relations concerning children.
Observing that "[it is in the case of children that misapplied notions
of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfillment by the State of its duties," 36
the great modern apostle of liberty stated:
It still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence
without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food
for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral
crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfill this obligation, the State

ed. 1984). In the United States, Professors Judith Younger and Thomas Oldham have both
been critical of the fact that American law presently governs all marrriages and divorces,
short or long, childless or not, with a single set of rules. Younger, Marital Regimes: A
Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for
Reform, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 45 (1981); Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. Fam. L. 263 (1984).
33. Maidment, Family Law Practitioner, 133 New L.J. 1053-54 (1983).
34. J. Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government 81,
95-96 (1951) (1st ed. 1859).
35. Id. at 95, 215.
36. Id. at 215.
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ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the
parent.37
Mill is well-known for having contended that laws making divorce difficult to obtain were an impermissible interference with individual freedom,
but it is likely that he would be astonished if he could see the ease with
which spouses today can divorce not only each other but, de facto, their
children. To him it was evident that "[tihe fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the
range of human life." 38 He deplored "current ideas of liberty, which
• . . would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon [a parent's] inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life or lives of
wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those
sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions." 39
To sum up thus far, the writer has argued that family property and
family support law is today in need of a basic reorientation in principle.
Once that is accomplished, a wide array of techniques for its implementation are available for the legislator to choose from. But what must come
first is a change of mind and heart. We must stop using an idea of
"marital" property to sweep the problems of children in divorce under
the rug. We must not let misplaced notions of individual liberty interfere
with the development of efficient child support collection and enforcement programs. And we must commit ourselves to the notion that having
children engages one's responsibility irrevocably.
PRIVATE ORDERING OF MARITAL PROPERTY

UPON DIVORCE

Let us now turn briefly to a related area where law reform is urgently
needed in most American states: regulation of the economic aspects of
marriage by contract entered into prior to, or sometimes during, marriage.
As civil-law countries have long recognized, no single set of legal rules
for the distribution of property upon divorce or death will be suitable
for the situation of each and every married couple. Not only do different
couples have different needs and desires, but the requirements of the same
couple with respect to their economic relationship may change over the
course of their marriage. Furthermore, as all legal systems acknowledge
to some extent, in the case of couples with dependent children the freedom
of contract of the spouses has to be subordinated to the need to provide
adequately for the children.
In most civil-law jurisdictions, the marriage contract is a well
established institution whose legal status is relatively clear."' In the United
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 220.
Id.
For a comparative survey of contractual regulation of marital property relations,
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States, however, marriage contracts (except for separation agreements) have
not been widely used, and American law traditionally has done little to
facilitate them. Indeed, until quite recently, the law of most states was
hostile to agreements which attempted to provide in advance of separation for the economic consequences of divorce, more hostile than with
respect to agreements relating to property distribution upon death.'
Now it is clearly time for a change. We need a workable legal
framework for contracts entered into prior and during marriage to regulate
financial matters between the spouses. One of the most significant
demographic developments of the latter part of the twentieth century is
the increasing proportion of older people in the population. Greater
longevity, together with the frequency of divorce and remarriage, creates
a significant and legitimate demand for a type of financial planning by
spouses that Americans used to consider unromantic. Unfortunately, the
law of the various states on this subject is currently in disarray. Substantial differences exist among the states in the legal treatment accorded to
contracts between spouses or prospective spouses. This fact in itself is
a serious drawback to the use of such contracts, given our highly mobile
population. In addition, within a single state there are apt to be inconsistencies among general contract law, law pertaining to contracts between
spouses, divorce law, and succession law concerning the tests for and limits
on the validity of agreements attempting to control the economic aspects
of divorce or the distribution of property on death. Furthermore, although
state after state is now abandoning older decisions that held antenuptial
contracts looking toward divorce unenforceable in principle, there is now,
with respect to any given contract, an unacceptably high degree of doubt
about the extent to which it will in fact be enforced. 2 These problems
were recognized in the draftsmen's prefatory note to the 1983 Uniform
Premarital Agreements Act which states that at present "there is a substantial uncertainty as to the enforceability of all, or a portion, of the provisions of [premarital] agreements and a significant lack of uniformity of
treatment of these agreements among the states."" 3
As marriage contracts in view of divorce have become enforceable,
courts have tended to consider some or all of the following factors in
deciding whether and to what extent they will implement the parties'

see generally Rheinstein & Glendon, supra note 27, at 148-65. See also Comment, The
Enforcement of Marital Contracts in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Quebec,
6 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 475 (1983).
41. See generally Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 141 (1979).
42. See generally Note, Antenuptial Contracts Governing Alimony or Property Rights
upon Divorce: Osborne v. Osborne, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 469 (1983).
43. Unif. Premarital Agreements Act, Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 201:0121, 201:0121 (Mar.
13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.A.]. The U.P.A.A. does not cover postnuptial or separation agreements.
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agreements: whether or not there was fair disclosure of the extent of the
parties' wealth at the time of the contract, whether the contract is "fair,"
"reasonable," or "unconscionable" (with some courts seeking to evaluate
these qualities as they were at the time of contracting and others at the
time of attempted enforcement); how the provisions of the contract compare with the legal support obligations that they would displace; and
whether enforcement of the contract would make one of the spouses a
public charge.14 Under alternative A of section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, a marriage contract is just one factor among several
that a court is to "consider" in determining whether its division of the
spouses' property is equitable. 5
The unhappy fact is that the spirit of discretionary distribution seeped
into the marriage contract law of the 1970's. Just as no one can now
be sure how a couple's property will be distributed in a discretionary
distribution state, no one can be sure whether an antenuptial agreement
will hold up in a divorce proceeding, especially if a judge is allowed to
determine whether the agreement is "fair" at the time of enforcement.
Thus, the principal issue in this area for the 1980's is not the enforceability,
but the problem of limits on enforceability of marriage contracts.
For persons with a substantial amount of property, the discretionary
distribution revolution, together with the uncertain state of the law concerning the enforceability of agreements relating to marital property, is
a disaster. It has become doubtful whether and to what extent inherited
or premarital property can be kept separate or in the family line from
whence it came. Nor can one be sure to what extent the fruits of a long
first marriage can be secured for the children of that marriage when a
later marriage ends.
Although the writer deplores the existing uncertainty about
the enforceability of antenuptial agreements upon divorce, the solution to this
problem cannot be simply that contracts between spouses on financial
matters should be enforced in the same way as other contracts-particularly
if one accepts the "children-first" principle put forward in the first part
of this paper. That principle would dictate that we approach the problem
of contracts in divorce similarly to the way it has been suggested above
that we approach the problem of property allocation upon divorce.
First, we must distinguish between childless marriages and those marriages
in which children are present or have been raised. Without entering into
details here, it is suggested that substantial limitations on freedom of contract in the latter case are appropriate, at least if there are dependent
children at the time of divorce. And, in fact, when one examines existing
law and the major law reform efforts relating to contracts between spouses,

44.
45.

Numerous illustrations are given in Clark, supra note 41; Note, supra note 42.
U.M.D.A. § 307, alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 142-43 (1973).
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one finds universal agreement that spouses are not completely at liberty
to affect adversely a child's right to support.41
The next question of interest becomes whether there should be any
special limitations (such as disclosure requirements) on the enforceability
of marriage contracts between persons whose marriages turn out to be
childless. The writer's own view is that there should be no special limitations on such contracts arising simply out of the fact that the contracting
parties are spouses or prospective spouses. Even without such special limits,
however, a significant degree of uncertainty may still shroud these
agreements if "normal" contract rules are applied to them. How will the
rather open-ended contract doctrines of good faith, unconscionability and
duress be applied by the courts in marital cases? Since contract law generally has become more fluid, making it easier than ever for a party to avoid
the consequences of an earlier bad bargain, ' 7 matrimonial lawyers can
be expected to seize on vague contract law notions in the effort to overturn spouses' agreements.
Here, civil-law techniques may offer a way both to assure the procedural regularity of the contractual formation process and to provide
an acceptable degree of certainty in the enforcement process. Assume for
the moment that the current version of the Uniform Marital Property
Act (U.M.P.A.) represents a reasonable substantive law treatment of the
problem. The U.M.P.A. provides that spouses can agree before or during
marriage with respect to property rights on death or divorce, or modification or elimination of spousal support,"8 subject to a requirement of good
faith, 49 and subject to the rights of creditors,"0 bona fide purchasers,"
and children entitled to support. 2 With respect to antenuptial agreements,
the Act (deliberately tracking the 1983 Uniform Premarital Agreements
Act) provides that such contracts will not be enforceable if they are not
voluntary or if they are unconscionable when made and if the agreement
was not accompanied by a fair disclosure, and the spouse attacking the
agreement neither waived disclosure nor was on notice of the extent of
the other spouse's assets. 3 The spouse against whom enforcement is sought
has the burden of proof on all these points." Where postmarital

46. H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 497 (1968); U.M.D.A.
§§ 306(b) & (f), 307(b), alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 135-36, 142-43 (1973); U.P.A.A. § 4(b),
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 201:0123 (Mar. 13, 1984); Unif. Marital Prop. Act § 10(b), 9A U.L.A.
35 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.M.P.A.].
47. G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 80-83 (1974).
48. U.M.P.A. §§ 3, 10(c)(3)-(4), 9A U.L.A. 26, 35 (Supp. 1983).
49. Id. § 2, at 26.
50. Id. § 8(e), at 33.
51. Id. § 9(c), at 35.
52. Id. § 10(b).
53. Id. § 10(g), at 36; cf. U.P.A.A. § 6, Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 201:0124 (Mar. 13, 1984).
54. U.M.P.A. § 10(f), 9A U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1983).
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agreements are concerned, the U.M.P.A. imposes a higher standard: an
agreement unconscionable when made will not be enforced." Finally, the
U.M.P.A. provides that if the contractual provisions on support would
render one spouse eligible for public assistance, the court may require
the other spouse to pay enough support to avoid such eligibility.
Let us take these provisions as one reasonable solution of the problem. What can a spouse endeavoring to limit economic exposure in divorce
do to minimize the chances that a contract governed by this or a similar
statute will be held unenforceable because of duress, unconscionability
or violation of the good faith obligation?
Theoretically, independent representation of both spouses is advisable.
The risks for the relationship of the parties from lawyers' exerting their
best efforts on behalf of their clients in this situation are, however, not
negligible. In civil-law countries, of course, this problem is nicely handled
by execution of the contract before a civil-law notary who advises both
parties and whose authentication lends great evidentiary weight to the
instrument. 6 The common requirement of judicial approval of any change
in the contract further promotes the widespread confidence in civil-law
countries that such agreements will be enforced as written. Although the
notary (in the civil law sense) does not exist in American common-law
jurisdictions, it is interesting to note a few recent statutory attempts to
achieve for marriage contracts something like the effect of execution before
a civil-law notary. New York, for example, provided in 1980 that marital
property agreements would be valid and enforceable if acknowledged and
proved in the manner required for a deed to be recorded. 7 Minnesota
has a law, adopted in 1979, which provides that antenuptial agreements
are enforceable if there has been disclosure of assets and opportunity to
consult counsel, and if the agreement is executed before two witnesses
and acknowledged. 8
Perhaps some more progress along these lines could be made by taking
a leaf from probate law. Most questions about the enforceability of marriage contracts involve the circumstances at the time of execution. Thus,
55. Id. § 10(i).
56. For the role of the civil-law notary, see generally N. Horn, H. K6tz & H. Leser,
German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction 44 (T. Weir trans. 1982); Brown,
The Office of the Notary in France, 2 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 60 (1953); On how the notarial
office survived and was transformed in Louisiana, see Burke & Fox, The Notaire in North
America: A Short Study of the Adaptation of a Civil Law Institution, 50 Tul. L. Rev.
318 (1976).
57. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983). The statute is a litigation breeder, however, in its requirement that terms governing support, as distinct from
property division, must be "fair and reasonable" when entered and "not unconscionable
at the time of entry of final judgment." Id.
58. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 519.11 (West Supp. 1983). The statute expressly permits spouses
to bar each other from participating in "non-marital" property.
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the best time to establish such things as voluntariness and disclosure will
also be at the time of execution, and not years later when memories have
failed, one party is dead, or both parties are engaged in bitter marital
strife. To resolve the analogous problem when a testator wishes to head
off a will contest, a few American states, borrowing from the civil law,
have made available the authenticated (or, as it is known in Louisiana,
the nuncupative) will, which is very difficult for contestants to set aside
after the death of the testator because of the formalities used to assure
regularity at the time of execution." An optional system of heightened
procedural requirements and formalities for execution of marriage contracts (along the lines of the procedure for authenticated wills) would be
feasible and useful under modern American conditions.
Louisiana is well-situated to lead the way toward a rational American
marriage contract law. Contractual regulation of marital property relations is already recognized in the Civil Code as normal and legitimate,6"
and a statutory procedure for authentication of wills is already in place. 6
Thus, more than other states, Louisiana is in a position, if it desires,
to develop devices which could promote the reliability of marriage contracts by establishing high quality evidence of their validity at the time
of execution.
PROTECTION

OF FAMILY MEMBERS AGAINST DISINHERITANCE

Thus far, this paper has discussed the problem of the limits on enforceability of marriage contracts mainly with reference to the law of the
forty-nine common-law states. In Louisiana and in most civil-law countries, however, there is another very significant limit on the freedom of
the spouses to arrange their financial affairs by contract, and that is the
prohibition against varying the order of succession. 62 Civil-law systems
typically protect children of all ages (and sometimes ascendants and other
descendants) from disinheritance by securing to them a minimum share
of the decedent's estate which cannot be defeated by will or inter vivos
transaction. 3 There has been considerable debate from time to time in
Louisiana over whether it is necessary or desirable to retain the forced
heirship provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, and, in 1981, these provisions were significantly weakened. 64 It is true that this peculiarity of
59. See M. Rheinstein & M. Glendon, The Law of Decedents' Estates 198-99 (1971);
Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 69-72 (1978),
60. La. Civ. Code arts. 2328, 2329, 2331, 2336.
61. La. Civ. Code arts. 1578-1580.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 880.
63. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1493, 1494, 1497; see also M. Glendon, supra note
29, at 284-88.
64. See, e.g., Leman, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 20 (1977); Le
Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 29 (1977); Nathan, An Assault on
the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 5 (1977). Among other changes
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Louisiana law is inconsistent with the law of other American states where
only the surviving spouse benefits from the major protective devices of
succession law. As older people with grown children increasingly enter
second or third marriages for companionship, however, the question arises
whether the time has come for common-law states to reexamine their law
which leaves a testator free to disinherit his children in all cases.
At the same time, the moment seems opportune to reconsider the
forced share for spouses which is presently found in the law of most states.
If the forced share was ever needed, it was in the situation where one
spouse held title to all the assets and the other spouse had no income
or property, as frequently was the case in housewife marriages under the
old separate property system. Most community property systems do not
have the institution of the forced share for spouses because equal coownership of the community funds means that upon the death of one spouse
the community is divided: one half belonging to the survivor and the other
half forming part of the estate of the decedent (upon which the forced
share for children is calculated). To put this another way, the equal division of acquests in traditional community property systems was a functional substitute for the forced share in separate property systems and
vice versa. Now that the traditional separate property system has been
displaced by discretionary distribution laws upon divorce, and would be
displaced generally by the presumption of equal coownership of all marital
property contained in the proposed Uniform Marital Property Act,65 the
law of decedents' estates is inevitably affected." As the common-law states
move by statutory or case law developments toward a situation where the
spouses are treated as coowners of at least the property they acquire during
the marriage (and where as under the U.M.P.A. all property of the spouses
would be initially presumed to be owned equally), 7 the need for a forced
share for spouses is far from self-evident.68 This is yet another area where
law reformers in common law jurisdictions may, if they choose, benefit

made by a 1981 amendment, the forced share of one child was reduced from a third to'
a quarter of the parent's estate. La. Civ. Code art. 1493.
65. U.M.P.A. § 4(c), 9A U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1983).
66. See Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights at Death: Re-Evaluation of the Common
Law Premises in Light of the Proposed Uniform Marital Property Act, 17 Creighton L.
Rev. 95 (1983) (pointing out the growing incoherence of state law relating to the rights
of a surviving spouse in the light of recent changes in the roles of women and developments
in marital property law).
67. U.M.P.A. § 4(b), 9A U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1983).
68. Forced heirship for the surviving spouse is criticized by John H. Langbein of the
University of Chicago Law School in a forthcoming paper in which he advocates a "timeserved" approach that would vary the property rights of the surviving spouse with the duration
of the marriage on the theory that duration is the best mechanical proxy for the relevant
variables of need, contribution, conduct, and desert. See also Volkmer, supra note 66, at
152 (arguing that the coownership feature of U.M.P.A. § 4, 9A U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1983),
was meant "to totally replace existing forced share legislation in the common law states").
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from comparative studies. But as the question of the rights of the surviving spouse is beyond the scope of this paper, let us put it aside on this
occasion in order to return to the situation of children in succession law.
A recent American Bar Foundation study sheds some interesting light
on the extent to which existing succession law in both community and
non-community property states reflects the current testamentary preferences
of most Americans.6 9 While a narrow majority of the persons interviewed
stated that they wanted their entire estates to pass to their surviving spouse
in the situation where both spouse and children of the marriage survived,
a very substantial minority wanted their estates to be divided between
spouse and children in that situation.7" The research supported the results
of earlier studies which had identified the case where children from a
previous marriage and a current spouse survive as an especially troublesome
one.'
This special case can be expected to be increasingly important.
It is therefore time to begin to rethink the way succession law operates
in cases where children from a previous marriage are in competition with
a surviving spouse, or with children from a later marriage. Particularly
troublesome situations arise when the surviving children are the offspring
of a long marriage during which most of the decedent's property was
acquired (perhaps even by inheritance from the former spouse) and the
surviving spouse was married to the decedent for a relatively short time.
Should the children of the earlier marriage be protected to some extent
against a will or inter vivos arrangements that leave everything to their
parent's companion in old age?
If, as is expected, this type of question becomes increasingly urgent
in the near future, legislators may be tempted, or induced, as they were
in the case of property division upon divorce, to turn the matter over
to the judiciary for resolution by the exercise of discretion in each individual case." This was the choice made by England (following the
example of New Zealand) in 1938." 3 Given the American experience with
discretionary distribution on divorce, however, it would be unfortunate
.indeed if recourse to this type of solution were to turn the relatively
smooth-functioning law of decedents' estates into another field day for
matrimonial lawyers. If comparative law teaches anything, it is the necessity
to be aware of the context of legal rules and institutions. Anyone who
advocates the importation of the English system of applications for discretionary maintenance or allowances from a decedent's estate by disappointed

69. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. Found. Research J. 319.
70. Id. at 359.
71. Id. at 364-70.
72. Suggestions to this effect appear in the literature from time to time. See, e.g.,
Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 497 (1977).
73. M. Glendon, supra note 29, at 280-82.

19841

FAMILY LA W

1573

.relatives and others should ponder very carefully the differences between
the English and the American judiciary and legal professions, as well as
the differences in their law of civil procedure. A legal device that may
operate in a relatively unobjectionable manner in a system like the
England's where most civil disputes are tried without a jury, where
discovery is restricted, and where the expenses of litigation are borne by
the losing party, can and probably would turn into a source of expensive
and bitter litigation in the United States.
As with property division upon divorce, the alternative to a system
of judicial discretion is some system of fixed rules. The latter has
characterized the traditional approach of the civil law systems and Louisiana to the protection of children against disinheritance. It may be too
soon for the common-law states to accept the idea of a forced share for
children as a way of dealing with problems generated by the formation
of successive families,7" but certainly Louisiana, which already has the
forced heirship institution, should think long and hard before giving it
up or further impairing it just as it seems to be responsive to a newly
emerging and important social need.
CONCLUSION

This paper has ranged over three loosely related subjects that at present are not handled well in American law: division of property on divorce,
marriage contracts, and protection of children against disinheritance. What
ties these three topics together, however, is that a proper resolution of
the legal problems of the 1980's in each area depends upon a long overdue reconsideration of the economic rights of children. The danger in
each area is that legislatures and law reformers have been all too ready
to see relatively unfettered judicial discretion as a quick fix. The reason
the writer chose to address these three subjects in connection with the
Family Law Colloquium is that, with respect to each one, Louisiana
already possesses a legal device which holds special promise for resolving
contemporary problems: the principle of equal division of acquests, the
existing legal framework for the treatment of marriage contracts, and the
institution of forced heirship. It is the writer's sincere hope that, as law
reform in this state proceeds, the modern advantages of these venerable
institutions of the civil law will be held firmly in view.
74. One writer has recently suggested that the common-law states should consider following Louisiana's example, however. See Haskell, Restraints upon the Disinheritance of Family
Members, in Death, Taxes and Family Property 105, 114-15 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).

